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BUSINESS LAW NEWSLETTER
U
Recent Judicial Developments in
Delaware Takeover Law
by Mark J. Loewenstein
In the past few years, severalDelaware cases have considered
the permissible defensive tactics
available to corporate directors
confronted with a hostile takeover at-
tempt. In judging defensive responses,
the courts' primary focus has been on
three issues:
1) whether the takeover poses a
threat to the company;
2) whether the defensive tactic is
reasonable in relation to the
threat posed; and
3) under what circumstances direc-
tors have a duty to become auc-
tioneers of their company.
This article discusses the recent judi-
cial developments in Delaware takeover
law. Because of the large number of com-
panies incorporated in Delaware, attor-
neys in the area of business law and
their corporate clients should keep
abreast of these developments.
Three Key Decisions
In 1985 and 1986, the Delaware Su-
preme Court handed down three deci-
sions that are now widely recognized as
the basis for analyzing defenses to hos-
tile takeover attempts. In the first, Uno-
cal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp.,' the
court held that directors of a company
that was the subject of a hostile take-
over attempt could take defensive mea-
sures if (1) the takeover posed a threat
Column Ed.: Jill B. W. Sisson of
Bearman Talesnick & McNulty,
Denver-M9-1500
to the company and (2) the defensive
measures were reasonable in relation to
the threat posed.
The court then applied its Unocal
rules in Moran v. Household Interna-
tional, Inc.,2 holding that a defensive
maneuver-in this case a "poison pill"3
-- could be adopted even in the absence
of a hostile bid. The court affirmed the
lower court's findings that the poison pill
adopted by Household was a reasonable
response to the threat that the directors
perceived, a possibly unfavorable hostile
takeover of the company.
After reviewing responses by targeted
corporations to actual and feared bids,
the court turned its attention to a third
scenario, an instance in which two or
more bidders seek control of a company.
In Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.,4 the court held that when
events make the sale of the company in-
evitable, the role of the targeted corpora-
tion's directors shifts from preservers of
the company's independence to auction-
eers who should seek to maximize the
value of the company. In Revlon, the
court affirmed the granting of an injunc-
tion against maneuvers that ended the
bidding by a bidder Revlon did not favor
and which assured the success of a bid-
der favored by Revlon's management.
Although the Delaware Supreme
Court has issued opinions in only two
other takeover cases since Revlon, the
Delaware Chancery Courts have issued
numerous opinions testing the general
rules of Unocal, Household and Revlon.5
These opinions explore what constitutes
a "threat" and what is a "reasonable re-
sponse" under the Unocal rubric; when
the Revlon auction duties arise; and
other issues left unanswered by the
Delaware Supreme Court. Some of these
issues are discussed in the following sec-
tions.
The Definition of a "Threat"
The threat in the Unocal case was
clear: Mesa's offer was two-tiered and co-
ercive. Mesa had offered cash for a con-
trolling interest in Unocal and had
planned a second-step merger that
would have provided the shareholders
with junk bonds for their remaining
shares. Shareholders who did not accept
the "front-end" cash offer would be
forced out of the company with junk
bonds. Consequently, all shareholders
would feel coerced into accepting Mesa's
offer in order to maximize their return.
The court ruled that this coercive aspect
of Mesa's offer justified Unocal's defen-
sive response.
Subsequent cases have rarely present-
ed facts as compelling as those in Uno-
cal concerning whether a threat is pres-
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ent. Nevertheless, the Delaware courts
consistently have upheld the determina-
tion of targeted corporation directors
that a hostile bid posed a threat to their
company, as long as the directors acted
in good faith and exercised due care in
reaching that determination. The most
telling example of this deference came
earlier in 1989 in Shamrock Holdings,
Inc. v. Polaroid Corporation.'
Shamrock offered to buy all of the out-
standing shares of Polaroid at a cash
price representing a handsome premium
over the pre-offer market price. In addi-
tion, Shamrock promised to pay the
same price, in cash, in a second-step
merger for the Polaroid shares not ten-
dered. When Polaroid planned defensive
maneuvers, including a self-tender and
the placement of a large block of pre-
ferred shares in friendly hands, Sham-
rock moved to enjoin these actions.
Polaroid argued that the price offered
by Shamrock was inadequate because it
failed to reflect fairly the value of Pola-
roid's patent infringement claim against
Kodak. Polaroid contended that, because
its shareholders might accept this inade-
quate price, the offer posed a threat to
them. The court expressed doubt that a
non-coercive offer at an allegedly inade-
quate price could ever pose a threat but,
nevertheless, upheld the determination
of the Polaroid directors. Polaroid per-
suasively argued that the Polaroid-
Kodak litigation was so complex that
shareholders might not properly evalu-
ate its worth to Polaroid and therefore
might accept an inadequate offer.
Shamrock and other cases demon-
strate that directors should have little
trouble persuading a Delaware court
that a hostile offer poses a threat to the
company. However, directors of targeted
corporations have had less success per-
suading the Delaware courts that their
defensive responses were reasonable in
relation to the threats posed.
Reasonableness of
The Response
Four recent Delaware cases have
found defensive maneuvers unreason-
able in relation to the threat posed.? Two
cases involved poison pills, one involved
a self-tender and one involved a restruc-
turing. In each of the four cases, the
identified threat was an inadequate offer
and the Chancery Court ruled that the
shareholders should be given the oppor-
tunity to accept the tender offer. These
cases suggest that once a company is "in
play," its directors cannot take defensive
action solely to end the bidding.
Other cases, in which the Delaware
courts refused the bidder's request for
injunctive relief, are not necessarily in-
consistent with this conclusion about un-
reasonable defensive actions. In several
cases, the courts have cited as a reason
for denying relief the fact that the bid-
ding was proceeding despite the objec-
tionable defensive maneuver and that
injunctive relief therefore was unneces-
sary at that time.10
"Several recent Delaware
cases suggest that once
a company is 'in play,'
its directors cannot
take defensive action
solely to end the bidding."
The Delaware courts are more reluc-
tant to interfere or to suggest that inter-
ference may be appropriate when the ob-
jectionable action by the target is part of
a bona fide, long-term business plan, as
opposed to maneuvers undertaken solely
to defeat an unwanted tender offer. The
recent Paramount-Time litigation illus-
trates this notion.
The Time v. Paramount Decision
In March 1989, Time, Inc. and Warner
Communications entered into a merger
agreement under which Warner share-
holders would exchange their stock for
shares of Time, which would be the sur-
viving corporation. The agreement was
part of Time's long-term strategy to ex-
pand its activities into video and film
production. It was the result of extended
negotiations between the two companies.
On June 7,1989, Paramount Communi-
cations announced an offer to purchase
all of Time's outstanding shares at $175
per share, which was later increased to
$200 per share.
In response to this uninvited offer,
Time and Warner agreed to restructure
their deal. Instead of a merger, which
would require the approval of Time's
shareholders, they agreed on a tender
offer by Time for Warner's shares, which
would not require shareholder approval.
Time shareholders and Paramount sued
to enjoin the Time tender offer arguing,
among other things, that the tender offer
was an unreasonable response to Para-
mount's offer.
In a lengthy opinion, the Delaware
Chancery Court denied Paramount's re-
quest." The Delaware Supreme Court
affirmed the denial.12 The Chancery
Court chose to treat the restructured
Time-Warner tender offer as a defensive
response to which the "heightened scru-
tiny" of Unocal applied. 3
The Time directors were able to pre-
vail under the higher standard of Uno-
cal because the court was persuaded
that the original Time-Warner merger
was a legitimate business decision un-
dertaken to maximize the long-term
value of Time. The resulting Time ten-
der offer, although reactive to the Para-
mount tender offer, bore scrutiny as a
necessary step to the realization of
Time's long-term plan. The Time tender
offer was reasonable, the court said, be-
cause it did not preclude the successful
prosecution of the tender offer.14
Two themes, which are consistent
with earlier Delaware decisions, emerge
from this opinion. First, a defensive ac-
tion that is designed primarily to defeat
a hostile offer is less likely to survive the
scrutiny of the court than one which is
based on an identifiable long-term busi-
ness plan.'5 Second, defensive action
which precludes a tender offer is more
suspect than one which merely makes
the acquisition more expensive or
changes the form of the acquisition.16
Thus, the Time-Paramount litigation




The Time-Paramount litigation raised
the question of when Revlon duties
apply-that is, at what point the direc-
tors become auctioneers for their compa-
ny. The Time shareholders argued that
the original Time-Warner merger was, in
effect, a sale of Time because the ex-
change ratio would mean that Warner
shareholders, as a group, would own a
larger portion of the combined entity
than Time shareholders. Considering
this, they argued, the Time directors
should seek to maximize the value of the
company by conducting an auction.
The Chancery Court rejected this
argument, holding instead that "control"
of Time really would not change as a re-
sult of the proposed Time-Warner merg-
er. The court stated that control re-
mained in a "large, fluid, changeable and
changing market." 7
Other Revlon issues were addressed
by the Delaware Supreme Court in a
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1989 case, Mills Acquisition Co. v. Mac-
millan, Inc.'s In this case, the court set
aside an asset lockup and no-shop agree-
ment granted by Macmillan to one of
two bidders for the company. In so doing,
the court reaffirmed its earlier holding in
Revlon and provided some additional
guidance on the conduct of an auction
for corporate control.
As to granting a lockup that ends the
bidding process, the court said, "[A]t the
very least the independent members of
the board must attempt to negotiate al-
ternative bids before granting such a sig-
nificant concession."'" A "no-shop"
clause, the court said, "is even more lim-
ited than a lockup agreement. . . . [A]
successful bidder imposing such a condi-
tion must be prepared to survive the
careful scrutiny which that concession
demands."2 0 In short, the Delaware Su-
preme Court will not tolerate the grant-
ing of concessions to a favored bidder un-
less the board of the targeted corporation
can persuade the court that the share-
holders clearly benefit.
Conclusion
The considerable litigation regarding
takeovers in the Delaware courts has
provided practitioners nationwide with
numerous precedents to consider when
structuring takeovers and defenses
against them. Nevertheless, many issues
remain unresolved. It is still unclear, for
example, whether a Delaware corpora-
tion can "just say no" to a hostile
takeover and resist it with a structural
defense. Some cases in the Chancery
Court suggest that a corporation cannot.
Similarly, at this writing, it is unclear
exactly what will trigger the Revlon auc-
tion duties. These and other issues will
surely be resolved in the apparently end-
less stream of takeover cases coming be-
fore the Delaware courts.
NOTES
1. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
2. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
3. A poison pill is a generic description for
a takeover defense that makes the acquisi-
tion of the target company unacceptable to
the acquiror. For example, the board of the
targeted corporation might distribute rights
to the shareholders which entitle them to
purchase shares in the target or, under cer-
tain cirrumstances, shares of an acquiror, at a
significant discount from market value. The
financial effects resulting from an exercise of
the rights are typically so significant that an
acquiror does not proceed with the acquisi-
tion while the rights are in effect. Therefore,
the acquiror finds it necessary to negotiate
with the target's board, which is the purpose
of the poison pill. See, generally, 1 Fleischer,
Tender Offers: Defenses, Responses, and Plan-
ning (1983, revised 1985 and 1987), § 1.9.c.
4. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
5. See, notes 8 and 9, infra.
6. The Unocal decision suggested this re-
sult, as the court said that directors can show
that they "had reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed because of another's
stock ownership . . . 'by showing good faith
and reasonable investigation.'" Supra, note 1
at 955 (quoting, Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d at
555).
7. [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L.Rep. (CCH) 1 94,340 (Del.Ch. 1989).
8. See, e.g., AC Acquisition Corp. v. Ander-
son, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del.Ch.
1986). Apparently, the threat in this case was
the possibility of a change in control of the
targeted company. If this is correct, there is
no need to identify a threat.
9. Grand Metropolitan PLC v. Pillsbury,
[1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.Rep.
(CCH) T 94,104 (Del.Ch. 1989) (ordering re-
demption of poison pill to allow shareholders
to accept tender offer); City Capital Associates
Limited Partnership v. Interco, Inc., [1988-89
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.Rep. (CCH) T
94,084 (Del.Ch. 1988) (ordering redemption of
poison pill so shareholders could choose be-
tween tender offer and target's proposed re-
structuring); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v.
Evans, [1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L.Rep. (CCH) 193,924 (Del.Ch. 1988) (enjoin-
ing proposed restructuring because it pre-
cluded shareholder acceptance of arguably
superior tender offer); AC Acquisition Corp.,
supra, note 8 (enjoining self-tender because of
its coercive aspects).
10. See, e.g., MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime
Computer, Inc., Civ. Action No. 10428
(Del.Ch. 1988) (Plaintiff MAI's motion for pre-
liminary injunction requiring removal of anti-
takeover maneuvers, including poison pill,
was denied. The court noted that such relief
"at this early stage" would be inappropriate,
but implied that should the "stalemate" con-
tinue indefinitely, the target's stockholders
"will be denied the opportunity to make their
own investment judgment."); Doskocil Cos.
Inc. v. Griggy, Civ. Action No. 10,095 (Del.Ch.
1988) (motion to require redemption of poison
pill denied, as its presence may enhance the
auction process); Facet Enterprises, Inc. v.
The Prospect Group, Inc., Civ. Action No.
9746 (Del.Ch. 1988) (court refused to enjoin a
poison pill because bidding for the target was
proceeding and an order of redemption was
premature).
11. Time, Inc. v. Paramount Communica-
tions, Inc., [Current Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L.Rep. (CCH) 9194,514 (Del.Ch. 1989).
12. Literary Partners, LP v. Time, Inc., Civ.
Action Nos. 10866, 10670 and 10935
(Del.Sup.Ct 1989). The court affirmed the de-
cision below and said that a formal opinion
"will follow in due course."
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13. If the court had held that Unocal did 15. Compare, Shamrock Holdings, supra, No. 9569 (Del.Ch. 1988) (restrictions in pro-
not apply, Time directors would have note 6 at 9 94,176 (ESOP was part of long- posed debentures did not preclude all
prevailed by simply showing that they acted term planning) with, Robert M. Bass Group, takeovers, only those highly leveraged).
rationally and in good faith-the standard supra, note 9 (restructuring was reactive to 17. lTme, Inc., supra, note 11 at 93,280.
under the business judgment rule. See, Aron- tender offer). 18. [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
son v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984) for a 16. Compare, Grand Metropolitan PLC, L.Rep. (CCH) 94,401 (Del. 1989).
statement of the business judgment rule in supra, note 9 (poison pill prohibited offer fr 19. Id. at 92,601.
Delaware. Closing) with, The Henley Group, Inc. v. 20. Id.
14. 7Eme, Inc., supra, note 10 at 93,284. Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corp., Civ. Action
INNMMORIAM
Jack Westley "Jeff' Karford II passed away on November 22, 1989, at the age of 33. A 1984 graduate of
DU Law School, Karford practiced with the law firms of Calkins, Kramer, Grimshaw & Harring and
Krendl & Krendl before opening his own law office in Englewood in 1987. He was noted for his humor and
congenial manner in the courtroom and for his selfess attitude in relationships with others. Karford's
friends have established an educational trust fund for his four children. Contributions can be sent to
Mountain Valley National Bank, P1O. Box 339, Conifer, CO 80433, Attn: Karford Children Educational
Fund.
Andrew Wysowateky, one-time public administrator for the City of Denver, died October 19 in Berthoud. He was 88. After
graduation from the Westminster School of Law in 1944 and service in the Marine Corps, Wysowatky went into private prac-
tice, then served with the Denver district attorney's office. He was named Denver's public adininstrator in 1951 and remained
in that office until 1974, when he returned to private practice. He retired in 1981.
Former Colorado attoey and District Judge Dean Johnson passed away November 8 in Tucson, Arizona. A 1936 graduate
of DU Law School, Johnson worked with several law firms before moving into private practice in 1948. He served as a District
Judge from 1970 until his retirement in 1986. Contributions may be made to the Lions Club for the Blind.
The Colorado Bar Foundation is another means of commemorating members of the profession. Contact the Foundation
at 1900 Grant St., Suite 950, Denver, CO 80203.
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